In 1991, Singapore undertook a novel constitutional experiment and modifi ed its inherited Westminster model of parliamentary government by creating the institution of the Elected Presidency (EP).
the Government " in order to protect these reserves, an action that might otherwise become a " highly controversial and politicized issue. " Thus, the fi rst white paper on the EP asserted that " such authority can only be derived from the will of the people as expressed in an election, " since unelected bodies " would be placed in a highly invidious position " in opposing the will of an elected government. 4 Since the inception of the EP, three presidential elections have been held -in 1993, 1999, and 2005 -and only the fi rst of these was contested. Section 15 of the Presidential Elections Act (PEA) 5 declares that, when elections are uncontested, the EP may be a single nominated candidate. In 2005, the incumbent S. R. Nathan, who was unchallenged in 1999, was reelected unopposed. However, this was not for the want of potential candidates; rather, the constitutionally established Presidential Elections Committee (PEC) 6 refused to award a certificate of eligibility (COE) to any of the other aspiring EP candidates. The committee considered each as having failed to meet the constitutional criteria. The PEC consists of three unelected " wise men, " as identifi ed in article 18(2), who are bureaucrats or members of the establishment. PEC decisions are fi nal and not " subject to appeal or review in any court. "
7 That this poses problems for the practice of constitutional government, not to mention for the principles relating to the transparency and accountability of decision makers when exercising public power, seems all too apparent. It is the purpose of this note to evaluate the constitutional and statutory regime governing the election of the president, with reference to the 2005 elections. Additionally, it will consider the impact that uncontested elections may have on an institution specifi cally designed to incorporate a populist or democratic element by requiring that the offi ceholder be the product of democratic choice as expressed through national elections. acted on the advice of the cabinet, 11 which has the " general direction and control of the Government. "
12 The initial proposal would have conferred on the EP the power to withhold assent to certain government fi nancial bills and, possibly, to veto key civil service appointments in the interests of preventing corruption. 13 Later, the EP's constitutional portfolio of reactive powers 14 was expanded to include a limited authority to review statutory exercises of power that curtailed constitutional liberties under the Internal Security Act (ISA) 15 and Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), 16 both of which contain clauses precluding judicial review.
17
This shift toward institutionalism was remarkable, given the prevailing official neo-Confucian ideology that valorizes " the concept of government by honorable men " whom the population trusts and respects, as contrasted with the " Western idea " of giving governments " as limited powers as possible … [and treating them with] suspicion unless proven otherwise. "
18 Donald Lutz, in a general survey of post -World War II constitutional trends, evokes the Singaporean experience, noting that many new democracies have had " elected presidents with varying degrees of political authority " and have similarly manifested a " general move towards a greater degree in the separation of powers. " While certain elected presidents possess " minimal powers, " nevertheless, " their presence has been matched by reducing the ability of parliament to appoint offi cials and/or to revise the constitution without the intervention of some other body. " 19 11 SING. CONST. art. 21(1). Exceptionally, the president was authorized to exercise his judgment in assessing whether a member of parliament commanded the confi dence of a parliamentary majority; this was in relation to the appointment the prime minister or declaring this offi ce vacant: arts. 25, 26.
12 SING. CONST. art. 24. 13 First White Paper, supra note 4.
14 Such powers were fi rst delineated in Safeguarding Financial Assets and The Integrity of the Public Service, 1990, Cm. 11, at 7, paras. 24 -27 [Second White Paper]. 15 Cap 143. 16 Cap 167A. 17 Preventive detention orders issued under the ISA restricted rights to life and liberty (art. 9) while restraining orders issued under the MRHA would limit rights to religious freedom (art. 15) and rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and association (art. 14). The EP's checking powers are set out in articles 151(4) and 221, respectively, and are limited, particularly since the EP works in tandem with other nonelected or bureaucratic constitutional bodies such as the ISA Advisory Functionally, the EP and cabinet, as components of the executive branch, are involved -as participants -in the same decision-making process when, for example, it is a matter of proposing, adopting, or rejecting a supply bill. If, contrary to the recommendations of a six-member constitutional organ called the Council of Presidential Advisers, 20 the EP decides to withhold assent to a supply bill, this may be overruled by a two-thirds majority of Parliament. 21 Thus, the EP is effectively powerless when the cabinet minimally commands a 66.6 percent parliamentary majority, as it does at present (the People's Action Party, or PAP, government secured 82 of 84 electoral seats in the 2006 general election).
Prequalifying to contest the presidential elections
It is easier to qualify as a candidate for the United States presidency 22 or, indeed, for prime minister of Singapore 23 than for the EP, which wields far less political power than either of those offi ces. The process is as follows.
Elections are indirect; potential candidates are vetted by the three-member PEC, consisting of the chairmen of the Public Service Commission and Public Accountants Board and a member of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights. 24 Before awarding a COE, the PEC must be subjectively satisfi ed 25 that the applicant " is a person of integrity, good character and reputation " ; 26 additionally, the individual must have " such experience and ability in administering and managing fi nancial affairs " as to provide for the effective discharge of EP functions. 27 The latter requirement is assessed in two ways; fi rst, it is automatically satisfi ed if a candidate has held any of certain stipulated public offi ces for a minimum of three years. 28 This ensures that the person has high executive or administrative experience in the public sector, although not necessarily fi nancial expertise across the board. boards, or private sector companies with a minimum paid-up capital of $100 million may also qualify; 29 thus, a candidate may demonstrate fi nancial literacy without necessarily having experience in managing public affairs. These provisions are more illustrative than determinative, since the other way to qualify is for a candidate to have held " any similar or comparable position of seniority and responsibility " in a public or private sector organization " of equivalent size or complexity, " thus providing suffi cient " experience and ability in administering and managing fi nancial affairs. "
30 The application of this loosely conceived criterion is nonjusticiable. In the absence of malice, section 8A of the PEA renders the PEC immune from defamatory suit when it exercises its discretion in denying a COE on the basis of bad character. The PEC may interview anyone it considers to have relevant information about candidates, and its proceedings are conducted in camera.
Ensuring independence?
To prevent confl icts of interest, article 19(3) precludes the EP from holding any other constitutional offi ce, such as a parliamentary seat; having active commercial engagements; or being a member of any political party. Thus, the fi rst EP (and former deputy prime minister) Ong Teng Cheong had to sever links with the PAP and relinquish his parliamentary seat. 31 Despite concerns that President Ong's former PAP affi liation would hinder his ability to operate independently, this proved otherwise at a 1999 press conference, in which he made public a long list of grievances and obstacles he had encountered during his tenure -an action that the government considered confrontational. 32 Ong felt that certain ministers and civil servants considered him " a nuisance " 33 and was concerned that he was not consulted in connection with the sale of the Post Offi ce Saving Bank, a statutory body whose reserves came under presidential protection, and, in fact, only learned of the sale from a newspaper report. 34 This sparked a 29 SING. CONST. art. 19(2)(g)(ii) -(iii).
30 SING. CONST. art. 19(2)(g)(iii).
31 During Select Committee discussions, it was proposed that there should be a fi ve-year interval before former members of a political party, particularly those who had held high political offi ce, would be allowed to run for the offi ce of EP. This would allow for some distancing from cabinet policy and lessen the prospect of unwarranted parliamentary infl uence that could affect the perception the EP's potential independence. parliamentary debate and resulted in various ministerial statements, culminating in a third white paper spelling out the nonbinding principles designed to facilitate a " harmonious working relationship " between the president and government. 
The EP as a work in progress; downsizing presidential powers
Article 5 of the Singapore Constitution requires that constitutional amendments be passed by a special two-thirds parliamentary majority. A special constitutional entrenchment mechanism, article 5(2A), was devised to require that EP-related amendments be passed by Parliament with the support of two-thirds of the voters at a national referendum. 36 This procedure remains dormant some fi fteen years later; the initial four-year moratorium was justifi ed by the need for a grace period during which it would be easier to effect amendments to the new institution in the light of experience.
37 (That, of course, leaves nine years without a rationale.) The government perceives the EP scheme as a work in progress 38 and by keeping it subject to article 5 -with its relatively easier amendment process -the government can maintain greater control over the offi ce. That the government can muster, at any point, a two-thirds majority is a foregone conclusion; as things stand now, the cabinet controls 97 percent of available parliamentary votes.
On the whole, constitutional amendments to the EP scheme have curtailed the scope of presidential powers. 39 Senior government offi cials have downplayed 35 The Principles for Determining and Safeguarding the Accumulated Reserves of the Government and the Fifth Schedule Statutory Boards and Government Companies, 1999, Cm. 5. 36 It is ironic that, although the EP scheme was seen fundamentally to reconstitute the government system, the issue of whether to have an EP or not was never put to referendum, while any initiative to dismantle the institution is subject to the modifi ed referendum system embodied in SING. CONST. art. 5(2A 
The 2005 presidential elections: election by default
The PEC is not constitutionally obliged to give the reasons behind its decisions to award or deny COEs, which it must render before Nomination Day, although brief explanations have been volunteered. In 1993, former district judge and opposition politician J. B. Jeyaretnam and Tan Soon Phuan, both Worker's Party members, were denied COEs for not satisfying the so-called good character requirement and for lacking the requisite fi nancial expertise. 42 The PEC awarded COEs to Ong Teng Cheong and former accountant general Chua Kim Yeow, whom government ministers had persuaded to run despite his reluctance. The latter made his disinclination quite clear by calling Ong the " far superior candidate. "
43 The government declared both these candidates acceptable, although the PAP declared support for Ong. 44 While no candidate campaigns under the banner of a party political, the PAP retains an interest in determining individuals ' eligibility and has adopted the practice of endorsing those it prefers. In 1999, the PEC rejected two other applications and awarded S. R. Nathan, who was endorsed by the government and by such groups as the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), 45 which has close PAP ties, 46 with the sole COE. 47 This state of affairs was repeated in 2005 when Nathan alone of four applicants received a COE. 48 The 2005 elections were notable for the way the PEC treated the application of a promising candidate Andrew Kuan, then aged 51, 49 who appeared to have signifi cant fi nancial expertise. Kuan had prepared well -creating a web site and informational CD-ROMs, 50 stating in media interviews his desire to see " more transparency, better corporate governance and better management of the nation's fi nancial reserves, " and stressing that the EP's role transcended the ceremonial. He criticized the government's approach in various matters, such as having sought public feedback on its casino resort plans when it had already made its decision. 51 Clearly, his proposed candidature discomfi ted the government. Nomination Day was August 17, 2005, with polling slated for August 27, allowing for an eleven-day campaign period. The last day for the PEC to issue COEs was August 16. Even before Kuan could be formally declared a candidate, that is, while the PEC's (ultimately negative) determination was still pending, his presidential aspirations were discredited in the media and by reports of government statements impugning his competence and character. The bias in the news coverage of Nathan and Kuan was both evident and troubling, refl ecting the fact that the media in Singapore is monopolized by Singapore Press Holdings, which has close informal ties with the government. The current lack of rules governing fairness in electoral campaigning is a major fl aw in government's institutional design.
Campaigning outside the campaigning period
The confi rmation of S. R. Nathan's candidacy, on July 12, 2005, was accompanied by a fl urry of declarations of support by government ministers and organizations, such as the NTUC, as well as by the frequent appearance of his name in the press. 53 This tacit but effective publicity occurred even before the prime minister issued the Writ of Election -it came at a point where there were no declared candidates, only interested parties. 54 Such endorsements might deter other Singaporeans from running for EP, because to do so might be thought of as challenging the political mainstream, a signifi cant factor in a depoliticized, semiauthoritarian state.
In contrast, when Kuan announced his presidential aspirations in August 2005, 55 he was presented as an intriguing surprise candidate, 56 who had been a grassroots leader 57 and a member of PAP (who was intending to resign). 58 He had also held various positions relevant to high fi nancial management; he had been the chief fi nancial offi cer (CFO) of the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC), 59 a statutory board whose past reserves are subject to presidential scrutiny, and the CFO of the Hyfl ux joint venture. However, news reports took on increasingly negative connotations 60 as his " trial by media " 61 began. News photos presented Kuan looking harried and beleaguered 62 when reports of his supposed May 2001 " ouster " from the chairmanship of his condominium management committee emerged, 63 and, again, when news that he faced a potential defamation suit became public. 64 It is a matter of speculation whether these allegations, the veracity of some of which remained in doubt, 65 and media reports of these allegations infl uenced the PEC decision of August 13, denying Kuan a COE. Thus, unopposed, S. R. Nathan, aged 81, was declared EP for a second term.
Trial by media
Kuan's trial by media came in three waves. First, his character was impugned by press reports quoting unidentifi ed persons who described Kuan in pejorative terms, such as " conceited " or " arrogant, " although these reports noted that there were some who spoke of him warmly. 66 Second, a question mark as to Kuan's ability was raised, albeit obliquely, by widely reported ministerial statements warning against the caprices of election results and pointing to the importance of having a qualifi ed candidate rather than elections for elections ' sake. 67 These reports also stressed the importance of the highest offi ce of the land 68 and the need for the EP to be able to " carry the fl ag of Singapore high in the international arena " and to rally the people in times of national crisis. 69 Such statements implied that Kuan had been judged and found wanting, 70 in contrast to S. R. Nathan, who had a stellar diplomatic career; and similarly, that Kuan was ill-suited for high offi ce since it was one thing to be a grassroots leader " but heading the nation is quite something else. " 71 This could be seen as an attempt to dampen the growing public appetite for contested elections. Third, his competence was questioned when a succession of Kuan's former employers were said to have declared his job performance unsatisfactory, with no details given. Urged by Prime Minister Lee to be transparent and disclose 64 his employment history, so the people could make an informed judgment,
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" job-hopping " Kuan sent the media his résumé. 73 A tempest followed when several former employers made public their grievances. 74 PAP MP Inderjit Singh, founder of United Test & Assembly Centre, said that his performance as consultant for that company had been below par; 75 Hyfl ux released a statement declaring its disappointment with Kuan, stating that he would not have been hired had his personal ambitions been known, 76 and that he had been asked to leave or else to be terminated. 77 The PEC reportedly asked the JTC to submit a report (sent on August 11, 2005) assessing the work and character of Kuan, 78 who was its CFO 79 from June 2001 to July 2004. Apparently, that organization also had told him to leave or be sacked because of unsatisfactory work, although the JTC had kept him on long enough to allow him time to seek alternative employment. 80 Following the prime minister's call for candidates to be open and transparent, 81 the JTC held a press conference on August 11, 2005, 82 where board members stated that, while the JTC had no reason to comment on presidential candidates, it was responding to Kuan's public comments concerning his employment at and resignation from JTC. 83 It was reported that Kuan had been asked three times to resign; this was accompanied by the terse explanation that he needed more " handholding " than was appropriate for a CFO. 84 Nevertheless, the JTC did not characterize his performance as " poor " or comment on his character. Kuan issued a statement pointing out that his performance for June 2001 to March 2002 had been rated " good " and that he had received performance bonuses. 85 Two days later, the PEC announced its negative decision. Kuan had not been asked to attend any PEC interview, and, indeed, the PEC is not obliged to conduct one, which violates the rules of natural justice. 86 Basically, Kuan's character and competence had been assailed in the media and in the public eye, with no redress available.
The PEC, volunteering a justifi cation of its denial of a COE to Kuan, explained that he lacked the requisite fi nancial credentials, seniority, and responsibility required by the Constitution, choosing not to invoke the more subjective " good character " clause, which could have been politically controversial. 87 This is incongruous, as one would assume that someone who served as CFO of a large statutory board for three years would have more than a passing acquaintance with accounting principles, certainly more than the Speaker of the House. However, the PEC's reasoning is not subject to legal or political scrutiny, and its verdict is fi nal.
Analysis and comment
This section critically analyzes the current legal regime regulating presidential elections and proposes possible reforms. 88 The aim would be to reinforce and solidify the practice of constitutional democracy.
Confi ning the campaign to the campaigning period
The Constitution bars a presidential candidate from membership in a political party; 89 the purpose of this is to remove presidential elections from the realm of party politics. The EP is meant to be elected directly by popular vote and, therefore, is political but nonpartisan. This is, of course, in contrast with the general elections, which are primarily, if not exclusively, a contest between political parties, although individuals without party affi liation may run as independent candidates for Parliament. There is nothing in the Constitution that prevents July 2007 Vol. 5: 526 political parties, government, or nongovernmental bodies with close government ties, from endorsing a candidate. However, because the Constitution requires that potential candidates be vetted by the PEC before they are eligible to contest EP elections, it may be argued that, to preserve the objectivity and integrity of this preselection process and to ensure it is not prematurely politicized, certain rules should be adopted. These rules could require political parties, government, and nongovernmental bodies with government ties to refrain from endorsing any candidate prior to the campaign period. This would forestall the perception, in theory, that the endorsement or criticism of a potential EP candidate by infl uential political parties or other actors was affecting the independence of the PEC decision-making process, which should be insulated from such extraneous considerations. In particular, since the EP serves as a check on the government, the government should, as a matter of constitutional propriety, refrain from " revealing who they would rather have as their supervisor. "
90 The builtin legal requirement of nonpartisanship governing the behavior of the EP candidate may be undermined by a political party's endorsement, given that the constitutional intent is that the EP should be directly accountable to the electorate, rather than beholden to any political formation.
Because the institution of the EP is vested with largely reactive powers, candidates for this offi ce do not contest elections on the basis of a positive program. Rather, they are scrutinized on the basis of their fi nancial or high administrative competence and good character. As Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong observed: " In the elections, what would be at issue? Surely it is the candidate's competence and experience for the job as well as his character and reputation, rather than his political affi liation. "
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It is the peculiarity of the offi ce of EP, or of its limitations, that so much emphasis falls upon a candidate's good repute. As result, the reputations of the candidates as public fi gures are deeply implicated in the electoral process; especially so, when one bears in mind the premium placed on the reputations of public offi cials and public institutions in Singapore. This is refl ected in the case law on political libel that characterizes as a public nuisance any speech that criticizes the running of public institutions where this abuses or harasses those in control of such institutions. 92 In light of this, however, perhaps the reputational interests of those seeking to run for the EP warrant similar protection, possibly through a right of reply to allegations that bear on character or competence, or by a procedure before the PEC (whose members cannot be sued for libel) 93 where candidates would have the right to present their side of the case. In addition to providing potential candidates with a forum in which to present their case or defend their reputation against attack, such a procedure would enhance the fairness and transparency of the process and allow the public to hear all viewpoints. This arrangement would, in turn, enhance the ability of voters to make informed decisions, as is appropriate within a democratic society.
The By analogy, the media's subjection of Andrew Kuan's potential candidacy to intense public scrutiny, prior to Nomination Day, may serve as a cautionary tale to future candidates. Kuan was not given the opportunity to present his side of the story fully vis-à-vis the criticisms made of him. Aside from his reputational interests, such criticism, left unrebutted, may have contributed to the failure of his candidacy. The prospect of such treatment may deter future candidates from seeking to run for EP. Were this to result in future uncontested elections, the institutional legitimacy of the EP could be severely undermined. Both the offi ce and the procedure by which someone is elected to it were meant to confer on the EP a popular mandate, thus arming the offi ce with a moral and political legitimacy that would enable it to serve as a countervailing power in relation to a popularly elected cabinet government. That goal is in jeopardy. A vote, as an expression of the political will, is meaningless in the absence of choice, even though the law provides a default rule for such contingencies. The democratic character of the EP electoral process is hampered, fi rst, by the interposition of the PEC as a mechanism for guillotining certain candidates and, second, by the application of stringent, elitist criteria. The situation constitutes a clear obstacle to the unmediated expression of the citizens ' preferences. The argument against allowing the presidency to be contested through direct elections is unconvincing and is predicated on a typical feature of democracy as it is interpreted in Asia, namely, the government's paternalistic distrust of the electorate. 106 This harks back to the days of colonial tutelage when natives were presumed to need schooling in the art of democratic government.
Prime Minister Lee has argued that the selection process is necessary and has been " carefully designed to ensure that the electorate is presented with qualifi ed candidates " 107 who are able to discharge EP functions with dignity and competence. He links this to the idea that the election processes of the U.S. president and the Singapore prime minister are subject to political scrutiny or parliamentary endorsement, 108 since a candidate for either of those offi ces must satisfy " his own political party's selection criteria and leadership tests. "
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Because the EP does not stand as a political party nominee and has not been subjected to the safeguards of an internal selection process, the fi ltering mechanism is deemed necessary to separate the wheat from the chaff. One might argue, on principles of direct democracy, that this task and privilege belong to the electorate, rather than the unelected bureaucrats or members of the establishment who do not represent any political constituency and are not subject to any form of democratic accountability. The prime minister, while maintaining that the current system has worked " satisfactorily, " has acknowledged that it could be " refi ned further over time, " 110 although he deems it " reckless " 111 to substitute less stringent criteria.
In contrast to the qualifi cations for members of Parliament, which relate to residency, language competency and age, and the absence of such disqualifying factors as bankruptcy, 112 the current criteria for the EP are comparatively onerous. By requiring that candidates be at least forty-fi ve years of age and hold or have held high public offi ce or directorships in private sector companies with a paid-up capital of $100 million, the pool of possible candidates is somewhat restricted. The elitist, proestablishment nature of these qualifying criteria is technocratic rather than democratic, and it severely limits the pool of available candidates. This institutional arrangement impairs the equal right of candidature, which is an aspect of equality under the law. Furthermore, the logic of democracy demands that a broad selection of people should be able to stand for high public offi ce.
In 1999, then prime minister Goh estimated that this pool represented about three to four hundred people, although the basis for this estimation was not given. 113 The small size of the pool of potential candidates caused public disquiet, impelling the prime minister's press secretary after the 2005 elections to send a letter to the press suggesting there were seven to eight hundred possible candidates. 114 The purpose of this, of course, was to refute criticisms that the pool -which currently excludes diplomats and grassroots leaders -was underinclusive and quantitatively minute. Downplaying the importance of the electoral process, the press secretary wrote that the dignity of the EP offi ce and Singapore's reputation would be diminished by elections in which " manifestly unfi t candidates participate, just for the sake of having one. "
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There has been no persuasive justifi cation advanced for the implicit assumption that the electorate is unable to determine whether a candidate is worthy. Further, the imposition of more demanding eligibility requirements for the offi ce of the EP than for that of prime minister 116 appears unreasonable, given that the prime minister's governing powers are far more substantial than the custodial and executive functions with which the EP is charged. The qualifi cations for the EP should on a par with the qualifi cations for prime minister, which are the same as those for members of Parliament.
